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AN AMERICAN STATE-FEDERAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROPOSALS
By HUGH H. MAKENS*
I. INTRODUCTION
State securities or "Blue Sky" laws date back to the passage of the first
such law in the State of Kansas in 1911.1 These laws were designed to prevent
promoters from selling "useless chunks of blue sky" 2 in lieu of valuable
interests in viable enterprises. Following the Kansas example, adoption of
such laws quickly occurred in virtually all of the states throughout the United
States3 and in Canada.4 The U.S. federal government was far slower in react-
ing to national patterns of pervasive fraud. It took an international depression
to trigger Congressional action in the form of the Securities Act of 19335 and
the family of related laws adopted through 1940.0
Most state securities laws are designed to provide full disclosure of all
material facts in conjunction with the offer or sale of securities to a prospec-
tive investor and to ensure the fairness of the terms of the underlying offer-
ing. The regulatory coverage of state laws is primarily directed to the initial
offering of securities as opposed to after-market activity. The jurisdictional
reach of such laws encompasses both securities sold within the state and those
sold from the state. This system is comparable in some respects to the Cana-
dian provincial laws.7 The practical limitation is the ability of the state to
meaningfully affect activity that arises outside of that particular state's boun-
daries. This limited jurisdictional reach is particularly crucial where securities
are sold outside of the prescribed regulatory framework.
In addition, the "Blue Sky" laws customarily regulate the activities of
broker-dealers and several address the activities of investment advisers. None
© Copyright, 1981, Hugh H. Makens.
* Mr. Makens is a member of Warner, Norcross & Judd, Grand Rapids, Michigan
and was the Director of the Corporation and Securities Bureau for the state of Michigan.
1 The Kansas Securities Act, Kan. L. 1911, c. 133.
2 Mulvey, Blue Sky Law (1916), 36 Can. L.T. 37 at 37; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U.S. 539 at 550, 61 L.Ed. 480 at 489 (1917).
3 See generally Loss, 1 Securities Regulation (2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961)
at 23-30.
4 Williamson, Securities Regulation in Canada (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press,
1960) at 3-46. See also Grover and Baillie, "Disclosure Requirements," in Anisman et al.,
I Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (Ottawa: Minister Supply and
Services, 1979) [hereinafter I Proposals] 349 at 368-70.
5 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa.
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78jj; Investment
Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, I1 U.S.C. §§72(a), 107(f), 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1 to
80a-52; Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847, 15 U.S.C. §§80b-1 to 80b-21.
7 Anisman and Hogg, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation," in
Can., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1979) [hereinafter 3 Proposals] 135 at 145-46.
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regulates securities exchanges; nor do the "Blue Sky" laws contain extensive
provisions regulating the daily operations of either broker-dealers or invest-
ment advisers. Rather, the regulations promulgated by the states rely on a
minimum of identification, disclosure, capitalization and broad record-keeping
paralleling the federal requirements and often adopting them by reference.
Perhaps the most common lament that one hears from practising securi-
ties attorneys in the United States is the concern over the necessity of dealing
with "fifty different jurisdictions." The implication of such statements is that
the states constitute an amorphous mass with no sense of unity or organiza-
tion. In fact, that is not the case. The states in recent years have acted
together to develop a number of common policies, procedures and forms, as
well as to share educational, enforcement and management information. The
Canadian provincial commissions have co-operated in a similar fashion with
each other. All of the states, as well as all of the Canadian provinces and
territories, are members of the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA). 8 The objective of this organization is the develop-
ment of uniform policies. NASAA has produced common policies in a num-
ber of areas, including the regulation of oil and gas, real estate and stock
offerings. For corporate offerings, the states adhere to the format established
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) forms S-1 through S-18.
Registration is initiated by using a uniform national application form. As a
consequence of these efforts and co-ordination with the SEC, the format for
disclosure is the same in virtually every state in the United States.9
There are currently about twenty-seven states which possess the statu-
tory authority to impose "fair, just and equitable" requirements on offerings
filed within these states.' If the administrator deems an offering unfair due to
excessive compensation to promoters, conflicts of interest arising from trans-
actions with affiliates or problems in the backgrounds of the promoters or
inadequate promoters' capital contributions, permission to, sell securities in
the state may be denied. The fairness requirements in these "merit regulatory
states" are likewise virtually identical. The major differences in state regula-
tion are a function of staff experience, staff size and professional qualifica-
tions for staff selection. These same factors must be considered when viewing
potential problems with securities regulation in the Canadian provinces.
In the design of the Securities Act of 1933, the American Congress did
not provide merit regulatory authority to the SEC. The existence of merit
8 California withdrew as a member apparently due to the personal pique of its Com-
missioner in September, 1980. It is likely that California will return to NASAA when a
new Corporations Commissioner is selected in that state.
9 The states presently use a uniform registration document, Form U-I, as found in I
Blue Sky L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 15103 and a Uniform Consent to Service of Process, Form
U-2, 5113.
10 See Goodkind, Blue Sky Lav: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements, [1976]
Wis. L. Rev. 79; see also Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective of the Report of the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, (1978), 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
147 and Makens, "The First Offering: Blue Sky Law Perspective," in Third Annual Securi-
ties Update-1981 (N.Y.: N.Y.L.J. Seminars Press, 1981) at 323.
1981]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
regulatory authority in the states, coupled with the potential impact of power
of such magnitude being vested in a federal agency, was sufficient to deter
Congress from endowing the SEC with merit regulatory authority.1 '
The SEC has been characterized by slow but steady growth during its
forty-nine year history. As with almost all government agencies, it has
striven continually to expand its regulatory boundaries, size and influence.
In doing so, it has too frequently acted introspectively, either by ignoring the
states, or by giving the states' concerns superficial attention. The SEC has too
often provided, at best, a light cosmetic treatment to a relationship that, until
ten years ago, was almost non-existent. The relationship is now in a state of
progressive evolution and significant strides have been made, but there re-
mains a wide gulf between the current relationship and an effective co-opera-
tive model.
II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION
The concept of effective government is easy to define. Taxpayers pay
for services, not agencies nor specific people, not intergovernmental bicker-
ing, not personal power for administrators and not agency prestige. The
taxpayer has one view of the statutory authority vested in an agency. He asks
that the agency fulfill its statutory task effectively and efficiently. The task of
securities agencies is to ensure full disclosure to investors to prevent fraud.
It is impossible to eliminate fraud or to obtain perfect filing compliance or
fully accurate disclosure, but with federal and state or provincial govern-
ments acting in concert, progress toward that goal will be far greater.
An ideal co-operative system should have certain characteristics:
1. In matters of common concern, joint policy development should occur
regularly, encompassing the ambit of all mutual responsibilities.
2. Free and open information sharing should occur, particularly in the areas
of economic impact, management and administrative systems, training and
statutory implementation.
3. The language used should be compatible and the interpretation should
also be uniform.
4. There should be a minimal duplication of effort, and unnecessary regula-
tion should be identified and eliminated at both levels.
5. All agencies should be responsive to each other and the public in a timely
and a reasonably competent manner.
6. Mutual trust should be the keystone of the relationship. Hence, integrity
of information, patience, understanding and a desire to perform professional-
ly should characterize exchanges. Candor in communication must exist.
7. Each agency should be willing to recognize the expertise of the other and
whether through that realization, by analysis of its own resources or by an
11 See House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (95th Cong. 1st Sess., Comm. Print, 1977) at 556ff.
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informal comity, should periodically defer using its power in order to pre-
serve the balance of the relationship.
8. There should also be an adequate balance of statutory authority among
the parties. Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it
clear that the states' "Blue Sky" laws are not pre-empted by the federal laws
unless they are in conflict with the provisions of that Act or the rules promul-
gated thereunder.' 2 Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that
nothing in that Act affects the jurisdiction of the states.'-, The NASAA en-
dorsement of the Proposed Federal Securities Code is indicative of state
willingness to co-operate in this manner with the Commission.
An illustration of the problems arising when the system breaks down is
found in the takeover litigation between the various states and the SEC.1
4
The SEC has wasted enormous amounts of man-hours struggling with state
tender offer laws when, by reacting co-operatively six years ago, most of the
current problems could have been avoided. The SEC was more preoccupied
with the theory of pre-emption than with solving the underlying problem.
Now, some states and the Commission are locked in litigation over the issue.
This is a ridiculous waste of taxpayers' money.15
To illustrate the problems and potential solutions, it is useful to consider
the opportunities for co-operation and conflict that arise out of the relation-
ship between the states and the SEC.
HI. ENFORCEMENT
Obtaining credit for the successful termination of any activity that vio-
lates the law is an essential element for any governmental body with an
enforcement obligation. To justify its existence before its legislative creator,
a securities agency must show a reasonable level of success in criminal, civil
and administrative actions. If it does not show this success, the agency's
budget may be drastically cut. The primary reason for the creation of a secu-
rities administrative agency is the prevention of fraud. Without a successful
record, the justification for the continuation of that agency may be called
into question. Thus, each law enforcement agency strives to maximize its
credit for preventing or punishing fraud.
While the SEC and the states are making progress in developing systems
to more effectively respond to the tremendous volume of fraudulent activity,
the ability to combat securities fraud is drastically impaired by the lack of
12 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a).
13 15 U.S.C. §77r.
14 See Pozen and Lamb, Rule 14j-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act and the
State Law Regulation of take-over bids, (pp 287-400) and Shapiro, "State Takeover Laws,"
in Twelfth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, Course Handbook Series 348 (Insti-
tute of Securities Regulation, 1980) at 401-448.
15 The message conveyed by the states' takeover legislation was relatively simple:
the existing federal system was failing dramatically. If the Commission had reacted by
treating the problems rather than fiercely guarding its pre-emptive authority, then perhaps
many of the state laws would have been enacted.
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investigative staff in virtually every securities agency. This staffing problem is
as real at the SEC as it is in even the smallest of the states or provinces. The
only means of addressing this problem is "selective" enforcement; cases with
some promise of visual impact and substantial threshold economic levels dic-
tate the allocation of investigative resources. In determining the appropriate
state-federal allocation of resources there are a variety of factors that enter
into the picture.
A. Communication
The first consideration is that of effective communication. Unfortunately,
fraud cases and even registration violations are not necessarily obvious upon
initial inspection. As a consequence, it is vital to obtain information relating
to the scope and nature of a particular scam before an evaluation can be
made to determine if it is suitable for enforcement action. The potential com-
munication problem between the states and the SEC is met in a variety of
ways. Three or four times annually, key members of the SEC staff meet with
state administrators and discuss current cases and investigations. 1 The pre-
ponderance of information at such meetings customarily comes from the
states. This is only appropriate in that the states, because of their proximity
to the action, are far more likely to initially detect the presence of a fraudu-
lent scheme, unless a multi-national corporation is the perpetrator. At these
meetings the states actively encourage the SEC to become involved in multi-
state fraud investigations,17 and the SEC staff may encourage state action on
a particular fraud or type of fraud.
The SEC has divided its operational offices throughout the United States
into regions.' 8 The Regional Administrator for each SEC office serves as a
contact point for the states to report and react to fraudulent activity occur-
ring within their region. Through periodic meetings and regular communica-
tions, enforcement information is exchanged on a continuing basis. The SEC
also maintains two extremely helpful enforcement tools. The Securities Vio-
lators Bulletin is a periodically updated publication, prepared by the SEC,
which lists alphabetically all of the persons that have been named in any
formal proceedings commenced by the SEC or by the state agencies. The
states can obtain copies of the "SV" book and use it as a quick reference to
determine if an investigative suspect has been involved in other securities
activities which gave rise to enforcement action elsewhere in the United
States. Second, the SEC maintains computerized enforcement information,
particularly pertaining to past and current subjects. Thus, it is possible for
the states, through a regional office, to obtain access to the names and schemes
16 See Leigh, "Securities Regulation: Problems in Relation to Sanctions," in 3 Pro-
posals, 509 at 619-20.
17See id. at 603-15, generally on investigations. See also Canada Securities Market
Act, [hereinafter Draft Act], in 1 Proposals, s. 14.01 et seq.; Commentary to Part 14,
Anisman et al., 2 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services, 1979) [hereinafter 2 Proposals] at 303-28.
18The SEC is located in Washington with regional offices in Boston, New York,
Atlanta, Fort Worth, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles and Seattle.
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of past and potential securities law violators in the computer. State investiga-
tive information is not included within the computer banks, but state enforce-
ment actions are included to the extent that the states report them.
In spite of the levels of communication described herein, a major failing
of the state-federal system is the inability to identify investigative matters of
mutual interest in sufficient time to prevent substantial public harm. Untold
millions of dollars have been lost because of the failure to centralize informa-
tion effectively as a means of detecting potentially fraudulent activity.' 9
B. Co-operation
Joint investigations are also a vital element in effective enforcement.
Once a fraudulent scheme is detected, it is frequently essential to maximize
available manpower for a brief period of time in order to develop sufficient
information to commence a proceeding. The pooling of resources is obviously
the most effective means of achieving this goal. Hence, for example, an in-
vestigation in Detroit, which affects activities in other parts of the United
States and in Ontario, might involve co-operative efforts by the Ontario Se-
curities Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Michi-
gan Corporation and Securities Bureau.
During the investigation, one agency is likely to emerge as the "lead"
agency for the purposes of developing the proceeding. While, in this hypo-
thetical situation, all three agencies would have the power to commence a
proceeding, it is likely that only one or two would do so to avoid the dupli-
cation of effort, but all would assist in the investigation. If criminal action
is appropriate, it is more probable that a state or provincial action is in order,
while if injunctive action is desirable, the SEC may take the lead.20 Further,
if the preponderance of the illegal activity has occurred beyond the boun-
daries of the state or province, it is more likely that the matter would be left
to the SEC. On the other hand, if the preponderance of the activity takes
place within either the province or the state, other jurisdictions are likely to
defer to that local entity. Finally, if the matter involves less than a million
dollars or less than one hundred people, the SEC is far more likely to defer
to the state or province because of the lack of federal impact of the matter.
Another consideration in determining the appropriate agency to take the
lead is the potential impact or prophylactic effect of an action upon others
who may engage in similar conduct. The SEC in recent years has been aggres-
sive in tackling novel securities situations.21 The ability to warn investors
nationwide, combined with the ability to warn promoters that the particular
scheme is not suitable for further exploration, is an appealing concept to the
states and the SEC.
19 The Draft Act, s. 15.12 mandates a co-operative level that should become the
model language for the federal and state statutes in the United States.
20 The Commission's ability to seek injunctive relief on a nationwide basis is obviously
a superior remedy to an injunction in a single state. While the states might.seek standing
in a federal court on a parens patriae basis, this has rarely been sought.
21 E.g., worm farms, movies and records.
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Finally, if speed is essential, the state or province will likely take the
lead, since a criminal reference processed through the SEC and the Depart-
ment of Justice moves more slowly.
C. Mutual Trust
Efficient law enforcement requires the existence of mutual trust between
co-operating agencies. That trust has not always been present between the
SEC and the states and is unlikely to always be present between the Canadian
provinces and the federal government.-2 The process of selecting government
officials has its occasional flaws, as evidenced by the periodic resignations
under pressure of various state and federal officials over the last fifty years.
The SEC may not wish to share information about a politically sensitive
issue in a state when other public officials of that state are participants in the
scam. Another area of difficulty arises when there is a lack of confidence that
information will be provided on a two-way basis. No agency is likely to
provide information if it feels that there will not be reasonable reciprocity.
Historically, there has been a high level of co-operation between Cana-
dian provincial authorities, the SEC and the state regulatory agencies. Regu-
lators from both countries exchange ideas and information as members of
NASAA.
Co-operation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has also been
excellent over the years.
D. Recognition
Individuals tend to respond favourably toward affirmative recognition.
The same is true of government agencies. The SEC, when it participates with
state agencies in investigations, generally recognizes those agencies, and their
co-operation and assistance, in its press release. Because of the wide-spread
dissemination of SEC press releases, states certainly appreciate the favourable
reference and this recognition probably provides a slight additional incentive
to co-operate.
E. Competence
For agencies to co-operate, a common level of professionalism is neces-
sary. This competence is obtained most easily through joint training and the
sharing of enforcement techniques. The SEC conducts an annual training
seminar that representatives from both the states and Canadian provinces
attend. In addition, several of the SEC Regional Offices host jointly-prepared
programmes by state and federal officials on current enforcement techniques
and recent developments in the enforcement field. Enforcement training re-
mains open to improvement, however, because of the lack of depth and
limited nature of the existing training.
22 The turnover of personnel, conflicting personalities, excessive pride and many
other human problems will contribute to the partial breakdown of the system. The prob-
lem with ideal models is that they must be implemented by people.
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IV. CORPORATION FINANCE
If there is an area where liaison between the states and the SEC has
historically been singularly lacking, it is in the co-ordination of the regulation
of business financing. The process starts well. In a public offering of securi-
ties that is to be registered in multiple states, as well as with the SEC, the
registrant may file simultaneously with the SEC and the states. All states may
use the U-1 Registration by Coordination form.m At this point in time, the
liaison between the SEC and the states has broken down quite frequently.
When the SEC promulgates a registration policy or disclosure format,
it does not consult in advance with the states regarding the contents of such
a form or policy. As a consequence, it is not unusual for the SEC to move
away from the direction taken by most state statutes or by a policy that has
been developed by NASAA. Recently, the dialogue between the SEC and the
states has improved somewhat in this area, but it is worth noting that Rule
146 (private offerings) ,24 Rule 147 (intra-state offerings) ,25 Rule 240 (very
small corporate offerings) 26 and Rule 242 (small business corporate offer-
ings)27 were all developed without the active participation of the states in
the planning stage. Since the states have an impact that is equal to, and fre-
quently greater than, the SEC in these areas of regulation, it is little short of
amazing that a more diligent form of co-ordination of effort was not pursued.
Most recently, signs of significant progress in improvement of the state-
federal relationship were exhibited in the development of Proposed Regula-
tion D, the revision and consolidation of Rules 146, 240 and 242. A NASAA
committee conferred and exchanged drafts with the SEC staff. State input in
final development of the regulation seems highly likely and the regulatiol
may serve as a touchstone for development of a uniform state exemption
encompassing all, or a portion, of the regulation. The SEC Release 33-6339
of August 7, 1981, contained specific reference to the state liaison and co-
operation. The states and the SEC have not yet moved to true co-operative
policy development, but this represents a major step in that direction.
In the development of a national oil and gas registration policy for
limited partnerships, the states and the SEC engaged in a significant dialogue
which led to both a greater uniformity and a policy that was acceptable to
both the SEC and the states. In contrast, when the SEC adopted Guide 6028
relating to real estate programmes, none of that co-operation and co-ordination
23 Supra note 9.
24 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 5718B, Reg. §230.146.
25 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 5718C, Reg. §230.147.
26 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 5741B, Reg. §230.240.
27 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 5741D, Reg. §230.242.
28 S.E.C. guide 60, 17 C.F.R. 231.5465. The states and the Commission are currently
working cooperatively to revise Guide 60 with a view toward establishing common state
and Federal disclosure guidelines.
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was present; rather, the SEC acted in splendid isolation.29 Likewise, the SEC's
cursory review policy was adopted by the commission without consulting
with the states, despite the fact that state approval in most instances was
essential to meaningful implementation of that policy. It sometimes appears
to the state administrators that the SEC acts arbitrarily and capriciously in
policy development. That conclusion is probably well merited.
Traditionally, the securities laws are thought of as having their justifica-
tion in preventing fraud. In the registration and exemption context, how-
ever, this certainly is not the case. The principal objective of the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act and "Blue Sky" laws is to provide an investor
with adequate information to enable him to make an informed investment
decision. The issue is not primarily fraud, but rather the identification of
business risk and the dissemination of that information regarding actual or
prospective operations in such a manner that the investor can be fully in-
formed when evaluating the merits of the securities offering.
Many states have the power to deny an issuer the right to sell securities
in the event of unfairness of the terms of the offering or because of inade-
quate disclosure. In analyzing an offering, the states will frequently exchange
comments, either through a centralized clearing facility located in one state,
or on a courtesy basis between examiners. As a consequence, there is sub-
stantial, though probably insufficient, uniformity in many states' comments
on a registration application. The SEC, for a number of years, followed the
practice of contacting the home state of a registrant prior to declaring a
registration effective. The securities administrator in that state then had the
opportunity to apprise the SEC of information that was locally known, but
that would not be readily available to an SEC examiner. This practice would
periodically result in the SEC being alerted to prospective problems not
disclosed in the offering material that related to either the project or the
promoter. This practice is not followed uniformly, probably to the detriment
of the investing public.
Other examples of this lack of co-operation and co-ordination are found
in the interpretation of common statutory terms. Both the states and the SEC
have been negligent in advising each other about positions taken on certain
issues or in discussing common fundamental concepts between the state and
federal statutes. For instance, even though the Uniform Securities Act and
29 NASAA presently has the following policy statements:
a) Publication or Distribution of Preliminary Prospectuses and Preliminary Sum-
mary Prospectuses, Oct. 9, 1957, as found in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 5151;
b) Qualification or Registration of Securities, May 24, 1945, 5201;
c) Options and Warrants, Oct. 7, 1971, 5211;
d) Registration of Oil and Gas Programs, Oct. 31, 1979, 5222;
e) Offerings of Church Bonds, Oct. 1970, 5251;
f) Open-end Investment Company Regulations, Jan. 1, 1953, 5272;
g) Uniform Reporting and Application Form for Investment Companies, May
1974, 5291;
h) Proposed Statement of Policy on Real Estate Investment Trusts, Draft, Jan.
14, 1981, 5293.
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the 1933 Act have substantially identical language, the states and the SEC do
not have a common definition of the term "security."' 30 While the co-ordina-
tion of such questions may periodically be impractical or not subject to com-
pletion in a reasonable time frame, these issues are of sufficient magnitude to
merit co-ordination at least between the SEC and NASAA, if not between
the individual states. Clearly, it is appropriate that a better information shar-
ing system be developed to ensure that such interpretative data is readily
available to both parties. The principal failure in this regard has been on the
part of the states where the circulation of "no action" and interpretative
opinions on a broad scale is relatively rare. Apart from providing such in-
formation through the publication of a newsletter, it is rare for that kind of
information to be readily available even to agencies with common concerns,
let alone to the public.
V. REVIEW OF A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
A. The Proposals Vis-A-Vis The State/Federal System
Howard, in "Securities Regulation: Structure and Process,' 3t reviews
the American securities regulatory experience in the context of developing a
model federal system. He notes that the major disadvantage of a dual system
is that it "institutionalizes multiple statute systems, making practical adminis-
tration and compliance with the law both complex and costly. '32 He points
out the need to develop uniform laws.33 His opinion is that the concern is
with "indirect microlevel mechanisms that attempt to minimize market im-
perfections engendered by government policies to protect investors through
cartel-like structures conspicuously designed to give the objectives of stability
and investor security priority over market efficiency, ' 34 and he summarizes by
saying "we are concerned not with displacing the market but with making a
constrained market work better."3 5
One conclusion that Howard reaches is that
the provinces tended from the outset to follow the U.S. state models which pre-
suppose that the securities industry is a kind of public utility and therefore that
an external government regulatory body should have broad powers to regulate
market entry, conduct and commission rates, subject to full consideration of in-
dustry views and to judicial review of the administrative process. 36
It appears that Howard underestimates the access that investors have to state
commissioners and legislatures and the concomitant awareness by such offi-
cials of potential investor problems. He also overestimates industry power
30 See Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A.) §401(1); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§77b(1). For examples of where the states vary see Commissioner's Note to §401
(U.L.A.) at 631-32, §401(1), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. §5541.
31 3 Proposals, at 1607.
32 Id. at 1617.
33 Id. at 1617-18.
34 Id. at 1625.
35 Id.
361d. at 1641, 1646.
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and participation in the analogy to public utilities. The analogy is appropri-
ate, however, in its attempt to define the scope of state securities law power.a1
The thrust of his article is then presented: "The central problem therefore
is to determine what institutions of federal-provincial cooperation will best
enable the government of Canada to contribute to this objective, which in-
volves consideration of the existing framework of federal-provincial relations
and the alternative coordinating mechanisms that can realistically be em-
ployed within it."' 8s The goal is, within the context of the prevailing general
economic policies, to allocate capital to enterprises that can make optimum
use of it and to achieve efficiency in the sense that capital can flow from
savers to users with a minimum of unnecessary cost.
The article attempts to define the role of the state/federal system in the
United States.
As already pointed out, when it enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 the U.S. Congress deliberately maintained a dual
or two-tier regulatory system based on disclosure and self-regulation at the
federal level and broad administrative discretion at the state level, thus assuring
a broad, minimum national standard and at the same time permitting more strin-
gent state standards. It follows, therefore, that in connection with each public
distribution of securities a prospectus must be qualified at the federal level and in
each state where the securities are to be distributed, a policy that is continued in the
ALl Federal Securities Code on the ground that the dual system is required to
empower the states to enact laws which better reflect local capital market condi-
tions and which give regulators broader, more subjective discretion to deal with
local market actors. Starting from this premise, law reform in the United States
has therefore been directed not at federal pre-emption or federal-state uniformity
but instead at federal-state coordination and state law uniformity.39
One can easily agree with the conclusions, except that the pressure for a
co-ordinated state-federal relationship has come primarily from the state ad-
ministrators and a few key contributors from the SEC, the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the NYSE. Until passage of the 1980
amendments to the 1933 Act there was little legislative pressure to attain
that objective. 40
If this otherwise excellent article is to be faulted, it is for its next con-
clusion:
In the federal Securities Act of 1933 coordination is achieved largely through the
intrastate exemption, which in effect excepts from the application of the federal
law any securities distribution that is confined to a state or a state and certain
defined contiguous areas. At the state level, coordination is commonly achieved by
automatic qualification of a prospectus that has already been cleared at the federal
level, obviating repeated scrutiny in several jurisdictions. 41
37 Id. at 1677.
38 d.
39 Id. at 1680.
40 The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat,
2275, Title V, §505, amended 15 U.S.C. §77s to mandate an annual meeting between the
SEC and the states to discuss small business financing and to develop common imple-
mentation procedures.
41 Howard, supra note 31, at 1680.
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This conclusion fails to recognize that essential difference between state and
SEC regulation, i.e., the application of "fair, just and equitable" or "merit"
standards. The states rarely disagree with an SEC disclosure position, but
will attack the areas of promoter compensation and conflict of interest with
a vengeance, despite clearance at the SEC.
Is the state or the federal system best? Is a combination most effective?
Professor Loss of Harvard University, author of the Uniform Securities Act
42
and reporter for the Federal Securities Code43 concluded that the dual sys-
tem of federal and state regulation was too deeply entrenched in the United
States to make federal pre-emption practicable there.44 Loss now concludes
that "[tihe only hope for simplification lies in uniformity and federal-state
coordination." 45 Howard defines that as the uniformity of statutory provi-
sions and the co-ordination of statutory systems, administrative forms and
administrative procedures. There are more factors than just comparable paper
provisions that lead to uniformity. Mutual need, mutual respect and mutual
effort at co-operation are the bases for uniformity, not uniformity mandated
by legislation. Ironically this latter approach can often be more divisive than
beneficial.
Howard comments that the "Uniform Securities Act sponsored by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [has been]
influential [but] has not been able to overcome the predilection of local legis-
latures to attempt to improve policy through subtle drafting changes to sub-
stantive provisions and of administrators to develop different procedures."
46
He notes:
Fortunately, the coordination of statutory systems through the intrastate exemption
technique has proved to be a slightly fruitful approach because it permits a state
to express local values in its laws and at the same time to subordinate those laws
to federal laws and so give priority to interstate distributions that comply sub-
stantially with the local laws. 47
It is not the intra-state exemption that makes the system work, although
it is far more helpful than most commentators realize. It is a combination of
common state action when dealing with national problems, or in many states
short of staff and funds, the inaction coupled with the review of stronger
sister states. The strength of the dual system in the United States is not the
application of local standards to local issues, but rather the imposition of
national fairness standards to sift out the poorer quality offerings that would
42 7A U.L.A. 560, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (C.C.H.) 5501.
43 Am. L. Inst., Federal Securities Code, 2 Vols. (Philadelphia: Am. L. Inst., 1980).
44 See Comment to §1904, id. at 966.
45 Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958) at 238. In drafting
the proposed Federal Securities Code, Professor Loss worked actively with NASAA to
develop a more effective co-operative federal-state system. Unfortunately, the SEC was
unwilling to participate in a dialogue on the Code's contents until it had been completed.
Once completed, the SEC did not invite NASAA to participate in its discussion which
changed some of the requirements that NASAA had supported.
4 6 Howard, supra note 31, at 1685.
47 Id.
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otherwise pass through SEC review by disclosing, in the peculiar gibberish of
prospectuses, the bad points of the offering. Without reasonable fairness
standards, the disclosure system would be a disastrous failure 8
In his conclusion, Howard points out that the converse of the American
state-federal disagreement exists in Canada.
Thus, although there is no concensus [sic] in Canada about an acceptable means
of federal involvement in securities regulation, there is a widely-held view that for
these reasons alone Canada should not adopt a dual system that would super-
impose a second, federal level of regulation on top of the existing provincial
system. 49
If there is to be a federal system, however, the unique chance to write
on a clean slate provides a chance to avoid many of the problems of the
American system.
With this overview of American relations to frame the perspective, there
are some concerns that merit consideration in discussing the Proposals For a
Securities Market Law For Canada (Proposals).
B. The Scheme of the Proposals
The Proposals clearly set forth the desired interrelationship between the
provincial and federal authorities. "[I]t is hoped that they [the Proposals] will
provide a basis for discussion not only with interested citizens but also with
provincial governments that will ultimately lead to a coordinated and cooper-
ative legislative scheme for the regulation of all aspects of the Canadian
securities market."' r
That premise is of such magnitude that its inclusion in the statement of
policy in the Act is vital to avoid the weaknesses that have been discussed
arising out of the present federal-state system in the United States. A major
contributing factor to the problems in the United States has been the absence of
a legislative, executive or self-imposed mandate among securities regulatory
agencies to maximize co-operative efforts. The mandate for federal-provincial
co-operation should, therefore, be clearly and unequivocally stated at the be-
ginning of the Act. In fact, the draft Canada Securities Market Act [Draft Act]
does expressly state that the purposes specified in it "can best be accomplished
by the creation of 'a Canadian Securities Commission' to regulate the Cana-
dian securities market ... in cooperation with similar provincial and foreign
public authorities." 5' The section thus includes federal-provincial co-operation
only as a means rather than as one of the purposes of the Act and should
be amended so that co-operation is expressed as a goal. Subsection 1.02(f)
now states that "national enforcement mechanisms are necessary" to deal
48 See Draft Act, s. 5.09. See also Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 82-85. The Propo-
sals, at 82-85. The Proposals support a national merit system.
49 Howard, supra note 31, at 1684.
50 "Preface," 1 Proposals, at ix. The Proposals, however, does not adopt the de-
tails of the Howard scheme, but rather, it provides a more flexible structure to permit
government negotiation.
51 Id., s. 1.02.
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with improper conduct "in light of the interprovincial and international char-
acter of modern securities markets and of fraudulent securities schemes which
necessitate cooperation between Canadian law enforcement agencies and
those of other nations." The desired result might be accomplished by a minor
amendment to make clear that co-operation between federal and provincial
agencies is also necessitated.
Two of the essential characteristics outlined above for an ideal co-
operative system are the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of effort and of
elimination of regulatory burdens imposed on those subject to the legislation.
It is unnecessary to deal with this subject here for Professor Anisman, in his
"Brief Submitted to the Parliamentary Task Force on Regulatory Reform, ' 52
provides an excellent overview of the techniques used in the Draft Act to
avoid overlap and duplication.
Three areas of responsibility form the backbone of an effective co-ordi-
nated securities regulatory system-securities registration and exemption,
brokerage regulation and enforcement. The Draft Act generally addresses
these areas effectively.
Section 5.09 contains provisions for a "merit" review of securities offer-
ings similar to the authority presently possessed by the provincial commis-
sions and by many of the states. Since the SEC does not possess this author-
ity, new issues of co-ordination and interpretation would arise between the
federal and provincial agencies. This "merit" authority, exercised in isolation,
can cause extraordinary expense to issuers without correlative value to the
investing public. Perhaps a mandate to jointly develop merit review standards
would ease the transitional effects of phasing in a federal system that includes
merit regulation. Joint hearings which are contemplated in general terms in
the Draft Act, would be the most effective means of developing common
merit standards.53
The Draft Act has many features which will ensure a more effective
joint regulatory system. Section 5.10, for instance, requires that the Com-
mission accept a prospectus filed in connection with an interprovincial dis-
tribution for use in any province that has accepted it. The Commentary to
section 5.10 makes it clear that a provincial government may establish the
standards of investor protection for all distributions in the province and that
"4no conflict exists between Part 5 [of the Draft Act] and any provincial pros-
pectus provisions that continue in force even if they impose less stringent
requirements than the Draft Act."'54 To provide national protection, the Com-
mission may refuse to issue a receipt on a national basis. The Commission
must, however, issue a receipt for any province where the distribution has
been accepted by the provincial administrator, but the receipt will be limited
52 Brief dated Oct. 27, 1980 [hereinafter Brief].
53 Draft Act, s. 15.07; see also Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 334-35; Brief, at 24.
4 Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 85.
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to the province in which the distribution has been approved, and the securities
may be sold only in that province.5 5 The Commentary notes that:
[i]t is likely that the section will rarely, if ever, have any effect because the pro-
vincial commissions will probably coordinate their vetting of a prospectus with
the Commission's and because they will probably be reluctant to permit a distri-
bution that has been refused by the Commission, after a hearing, pursuant to the
standards specified for the exercise of its blue sky discretion.55
There is no comparable provision in the state-federal system.
There has been no attempt in this paper to compare the provincial ex-
emptions with those of the Draft Act. 57 It is worth stating, however, that for
exemptions to be effective in providing a reduction of unneeded regulation,
they must parallel the provincial exemptions. The cost and confusion of this,
as shown by the failure of the SEC and the states to co-ordinate exemptions,
is staggering and largely unnecessary.
The Draft Act does retain an intra-provincial exemption similar to the
intra-state offering used in the United States.58 This exemption places the sole
authority in the provinces over matters pertaining to the distributions made in
a single province. This exemption is used for most small offerings made in the
United States.59 The fault of both the intra-state and intra-provincial exemp-
tion is the failure to recognize an exemption for contiguous geographical
areas such as Ottawa and Hull, located in different provinces. A distribution
regulated by the provinces of Quebec and Ontario would not raise a signifi-
cant federal concern and likewise would warrant an exemption. The Com-
mentary recognizes that "difficulties will inevitably occur" in such circum-
stances and states that while the exemption "may not be available.., the
Commission will probably develop policies and regulations to deal with such
cases" under its general exempting powers.60
Part 8, relating to "Market Actors," fails to contain a complete system
for co-ordinating the broker-dealer requirements of the provinces and the
federal government. Considering the agony that was experienced over the years
spent in the United States in attempting to bring about such co-ordination,
inclusion of an effective system for uniformity adopting forms and procedures
is an absolute necessity. Section 8.03 provides for the acceptance of a filing
made in a province, but it can be limited to that province. The mandate to
develop uniform forms would be a simple addition to the proposed Part 8.
This part does provide an exemption for broker-dealer firms that carry
on business exclusively within one province. 61 "[C]oordination with the pro-
55Draft Act, s. 5.10. See also s. 6.05 and Commentary, at 104-106.
56 Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 86.
57 See Parts 3, "Exemptions," and 6, "Exemptions from Prospectus Requirements,"
and the Commentary on these Parts, 2 Proposals, at 45-58 and 106 respectively.
58 Draft Act, s. 6.05 and Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 104-106.
59 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) §5718C, Reg. §230.147; Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §77C(a) (11).
6o Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 105.
61 Draft Act, s. 8.07.
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vincial laws, as well as avoidance of duplication of administrative effort, is
reinforced by requiring the Commission to grant a license to a person regis-
tered in any province at least for purposes of local trading." 62
Although the Draft Act contemplates exclusive federal jurisdiction over
stock exchanges and clearing agencies, other self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) such as associations of securities firms, are treated in the same man-
ner as securities firms under Part 8.63 Nevertheless, once any SRO becomes
registered, the provisions in Part 9 will likely prevail. There should therefore
be a specific provision establishing an interrelationship between a registered
SRO and the provinces that clearly permits an SRO and under certain cir-
cumstances, requires an SRO to co-operate with provincial commissions in
such matters as inspections, investigations and the development of policy.
While the relationship of the NASD and the various stock exchanges with
the states in the United States is generally good, both sides could benefit from
more effective co-ordination in these areas. The provision recognizing the
provincial registration of SROs may be modified to attain this objective as
well as to ensure the "grandfathering" of existing SROs.
Enforcement regulation is covered in Part 14. The powers and proce-
dures follow very closely those found in both the federal and state systems
in the United States. The Draft Act, however, contains a number of improve-
ments. Section 14.01 contemplates the possibility of appointing provincial
authorities in the capacity of investigators for the Commission. This authority
is clear when read in conjunction with sections 15.09 and 15.10.65
Section 14.02 contemplates the Commission conducting an inquiry to
aid in the development of new policy. Sections 15.09 and 15.10 make pro-
visions for joint hearings with the provincial authorities. The Draft Act also
contemplates the possibility of the Commission designating provincial author-
ities to hold such hearings within each province.6 By this means of local
contact, far more meaningful and complete commentaries can be obtained on
matters of national impact.
C. The Commission
The Canadian Securities Commission (CSC) should include representa-
tives of the provincial securities agencies and of the associations of such
agencies. This would be a unique opportunity to avoid the bifurcated policy
formulation characterizing the present American system while preserving the
"laboratory" value of provincial regulation. Section 15.01, which establishes
the composition of the CSC, should provide specifically for provincial "seats,"
combining elements of the CANSEC 7 proposal. While this suggestion is
62 Commentary to Part 8, 2 Proposals, at 129.
63 See Draft Act, s. 9.01; 2 Proposals, at 150.
64 See Draft Act, s. 9.04; 2 Proposals, at 154-55.
65 See Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 338-39.
6 Draft Act, s. 15.09; 2 Proposals, at 338-39.
67 CANSEC: Legal and Administrative Concepts, [1967] O.S.C.B. 61 at 65. See
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contained in the Commentary to section 15.01,8 it is suggested that a specific
statutory mandate would be preferable.
The contract approach advocated in section 15.06, whereby an agree-
ment may be negotiated between a provincial government and the federal
government to permit the provincial government to assume all or a portion
of the powers and responsibilities of the federal government within the prov-
ince or, alternatively, whereby the province could delegate such powers under
its provincial statute to the federal government, offers a unique opportunity
to fill the enforcement void existing in a few of the provinces presently.
Somehow the number of offenders always seems to exceed the staff and re-
sources of law enforcement. Based on conversations with provincial commis-
sioners, it is believed that this is presently the case across Canada, as it is in
the United States.
Any such contract should be carefully drawn to ensure that policies
developed by one unit of government are not inadvertently undercut by the
other through precipitous conduct. Co-operative rather than unilateral action
should characterize the relationship, at least at the decisional stage. Bear in
mind, however, that the keystone of such a relationship will be timely re-
sponsivenes. Nothing will more quickly reduce co-operation than a system
that permits the diligence of one body to be rendered moot by the dalliance
of another.
The contract approach would also serve to eliminate some of the infor-
mation sharing limitations which have grown out of the American Freedom
of Information Act 9 and Privacy Act.70 In the rush for open government
and individual privacy, the American Congress has significantly and unneces-
sarily hampered law enforcement. State legislatures have likewise enacted
similar provisions. An internally co-ordinated system eliminates the need for
treating sister agencies as trespassers in the halls of justice. Section 15.23(2)
of the Draft Act addresses this question well as between agencies, but not as
to the use of such information, for example the use of such information in a
subsequent proceeding.
The Commentary to section 15.06 suggests substantial flexibility is pro-
vided in the establishment of federal-provincial relationships. 1 Such a co-
operative environment is to emerge from negotiations between the govern-
ment units rather than as a result of a mandate from the federal government.
This has two significant advantages: first, that no legislative body can possess
the in-depth knowledge necessary to form such a system efficiently, given the
generally Langford and Johnston, The Case for a National Securities Commission, [1968]
in U. Toronto Comm. J. 21; Banwell, Proposals for a National Securities ComMission
(1969), 1 Intra. L.J 3.
,08 See Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 332.
69Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. 1, no. 89-554, §1, 80 Stat. 383; 5
U.S.C. §552.
7OPrivacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, §3, 88 Stat. 1896, 5 U.S.C. §552a.
71 Commentary, 2 Proposals, at 334.
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provincial regulatory history and its absence on the federal level; and second,
that the system must be as flexible and adaptive as the changing securities
markets. Providing specific statutory guidance through common substantive
requirements and leaving the administrative system to emerge with an effi-
cient, yet fluid, market control mechanism appears the wisest approach.
Perhaps the major failing of the federal system in the United States is
the inability to provide meaningful dual policy development between the SEC
and the states. Section 15.07, which permits a provincial body to participate in
hearings, provides one mechanism to achieve policy participation, especially
if the initial stage of rule-making proceedings are contemplated by this sec-
tion. To the extent that a provincial administrator is vested with authority in
an investigation, the provinces likewise have enhanced policy power.
Section 15.09 might be read as a limitation on the power of provinces
to participate in the regulation promulgation process, or merely as an expres-
sion of the fact that regulation must emanate from the body empowered by
statute to create regulation. It would be beneficial if the provinces were spe-
cifically permitted to participate in the regulation formation process. The
Commentary does not address this crucial issue. Sections 15.07 and 15.10
could, however, be used for this purpose.
Section 15.11 appears on its face to be one of the most routine of statu-
tory provisions, mandating an annual report to the Minister and Parliament.
It can, however, serve as the basis for establishing a measuring stick of co-
operative progress. The reporting requirements should be amended to include
an overall report on the status of federal-provincial relations and specifically
to enumerate joint enforcement actions and common policies and procedures
developed or in formation.
Section 15.12 provides the heart of a joint programme. It mandates that
the Commission shall co-operate with the provincial securities commissions
and other persons responsible for the administration of a securities act "in
order to minimize duplication of effort and maximize the protection afforded
investors in Canada." If the spirit of this provision does not get lost in a
bureaucratic maze or an individual's quest for personal power, this is the seed
from which an effective dual system can grow. It is important that the direc-
tion be primarily from the federal system toward the provinces, rather than
from the reverse direction, since the federal system will in all probability be
better funded and clearly can act on a unitary basis when approaching the
provincial administrators.
Section 15.12(4) could be narrowly read to limit the level of co-opera-
tion with "intergovernmental, national or international organizations" to
securities markets. 2 A far better choice of words would be the more expan-
sive securities "regulation." The provincial participation in the North Ameri-
can Securities Commissioners Association has resulted in substantial benefits
for both the Canadian and American participants and such a restrictive inter-
7
2 Although the section permits the Commission to participate in the work of "or-
ganizations dealing with the regulation of securities markets," [emphasis added] a narrow
reading might, improperly, emphasize "markets" rather than their regulation.
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pretation could impair the ability of the federal government to join in such
an organization. Either the Draft Act or the Commentary should reflect this
thought.
Section 15.15 permits the Commission to make regulations governing a
wide spectrum of securities activities. Such regulation should be done in co-
operation with the provinces, preferably prior to publication as prescribed in
section 15.15.
Flexibility and discretion are not the adversaries of business when pro-
perly implemented by a governmental agency. Section 15.16 provides that
the Commission may issue special orders relating to almost any matter en-
compassed by the Draft Act, thus ensuring an open and flexible regulatory
environment. Prior to effectiveness of such orders, the provinces should have
an opportunity to comment on any orders concerning applicants from their
provinces in the manner contemplated in section 15.17 on self-regulatory
organizations.
A shelter from civil proceedings is provided in section 15.22 for a com-
missioner, employee or agent of the Commission acting in good faith. Persons
acting under sections 15.06 or 15.09 should be specifically included in that
grant.
VI CONCLUSION
It is difficult to write this type of article, since there is the basis for a
full-length article or more on any of the topics discussed, hence the narrow-
ness of the scope of the response.
If there is one message to convey to the drafters of the legislation which
may emerge from this Herculean project undertaken by Professor Anisman
with the help of Messrs. Grover, Howard and Williamson and the many
individuals who assisted them, 7 3 it is that effective regulation does not re-
quire total uniformity but rather a system which is goal rather than product
oriented. The Canada Securities Market Act will be measured, not by its
clarity (though this obviously is an important objective), nor by its com-
prehensiveness, but rather by the ability of those who administer it to meet
the objectives of investor protection and the enhancement of the capital mar-
kets. Uniformity cannot be achieved at the price of imaginative solutiorls;
economy cannot be attained at the cost of impairment of necessary investor
protections. No world has been made perfect by law.
Given sufficient latitude to operate and a true spirit of co-operation be-
tween federal and provincial authorities, this Draft Act is drafted ii, a man-
ner that will substantially enhance investor protection in Canada. To develop
a successful joint venture requires that each side have significant bargaining
power in dealing with the other and that both are clearly directed toward a
common objective. The Draft Act falls short of that goal for the reasons set
out. The changes required to attain a workable draft, however, do not appear
difficult to achieve.
73 See "Preface," 1 Proposuls, at ix-xi.
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